Hastings Law Journal
Volume 52 | Issue 2

Article 1

1-2001

No Ordinary Joe: Joseph R. Grodin and His
Influence on California's Law of the Workplace
Christopher David Ruiz Cameron

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, No Ordinary Joe: Joseph R. Grodin and His Influence on California's Law of the Workplace, 52
Hastings L.J. 253 (2001).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol52/iss2/1

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Essay
No Ordinary Joe: Joseph R. Grodin
and His Influence on California's Law
of the Workplace
by
CHRISTOPHER DAVID RuIz CAMERON*

Perhaps the strangest employment law case in which Joseph R.
Grodin participated during his career as a jurist was Spiritual Psychic
Science Church v. City of Azusa,' which came before the California

Supreme Court in 1985.2
The church and its minister, Fatima Stevens, had brought an
action challenging a city ordinance outlawing fortune telling for

money.3 In its wisdom, the City of Azusa, California-whose name is
an acronym for "everything from A to Z in the U.S.A." 4-had
outlawed a smorgasbord of similar trades, including astrology, tea
reading, clairvoyance, crystal gazing, hypnotism, magic, and
palmistry.5 The question presented was whether Azusa's ordinance
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Southwestern
University School of Law. A.B. 1980, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. 1983,
Harvard Law School. This Article was originally presented on March 9, 2000 to the
Twentieth Annual Southern California Labor & Employment Law Symposium, which was
sponsored by the Labor & Employment Law Section of the Los Angeles County Bar
Association. I am grateful to Fred Horowitz, Pam Hemminger, Glenn Rothner, and Scott
Silverman for making that possible. Loura Alaverdi and Danielle Padula (Class of 2001)
and Agnes Opara (Class of 2002) provided valuable research assistance. Any remaining
errors are mine alone.
1. 703 P.2d 1119 (Cal. 1985).
2. For Grodin's own account of the story, see JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 67 (1989) [hereinafter

GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE].

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Spiritual,703 P.2d at 1120 (quoting AZUSA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.52.060).
[253]
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ran afoul of the right to freedom of expression protected by both the
state and federal constitutions. 6 At oral argument, members of the
Court welcomed the case as a break from a calendar full of
"depressing criminal cases."' 7 In fact, as Grodin described it, "[the
justices] were all feeling a bit mischievous."'8 He asked the city
attorney, who had to defend the ordinance, whether the statute would
prohibit magazines that made stock market predictions. 9 The city
attorney asserted that such predictions are based in science, whereas
fortune telling is based only upon fraud. 10 The record did not reflect
whether stock pickers in the City of Azusa were better predictors of
the future than the City's fortune tellers.
According to Grodin, the best question from the bench was put
to the minister's attorney by the then-Justice Malcolm Lucas."
"Surely, [Justice Lucas] suggested, [Ms. Stevens] must have told him
how the case was going to come out: would he mind sharing that
information with the Court?"'1 2 Stevens' attorney answered that his
client was confident of prevailing. 13 Stevens' prediction turned out to
be right. The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stanley Mosk
and signed by Justice Grodin, upheld Stevens' challenge to the
14
ordinance as unconstitutionally overbroad.
When it comes to analyzing the past, articulating the present, or
predicting the future of the law of the workplace in California, no one
has been more influential than Joseph Grodin. This has been true
precisely because he has had a variety of opportunities to advocate,
write, and comment. The fortune-teller case is but one example of
how Justice Grodin has taken advantage of those opportunities to
shape the law-in that case, by using his trademark wit and wisdom.
In a law career spanning five decades, Justice Grodin has served
as a union lawyer, law professor, arbitrator, founding member of the
Agricultural Labor Relations Board, Justice of the California Court
of Appeal, Justice of the California Supreme Court, and law professor
once more. 15
6. Id. at 1121.
7. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

2, at 67.

ld.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

13. Id.
14. Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa, 703 P.2d 1119, 1129-30 (Cal.
1985).
15. See GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 67.
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During these same years, the narrow field of practice once called

"labor law" has been transformed into the bundle of practice areas
we now call "labor and employment law." Whereas the labor lawyer
of yesterday was preoccupied with rules regulating workers' access to

collective bargaining institutions, today's employment attorney is
concerned with every attempt from A to Z to govern the modern

workplace.

From employment discrimination to unemployment

compensation, and from family and medical leave to wrongful

termination, the law of the workplace comprises a long list-a list that
seems to get longer each day.

Although the Golden State has produced more than its share of
contemporary labor and employment gurus, including Professors
Benjamin Aaron of UCLA, 16 David Feller of Boalt Hall,17 and
William B. Gould IV of Stanford,18 none has shaped the law of the
workplace as extensively as Grodin has.
The case for Grodin's influence in developing California labor
and employment law has three parts. Part I recounts his career and
summarizes his judicial and scholarly output. Part II places that
career in perspective by identifying his four most important
contributions to the law of the workplace. Part III concludes by
offering some predictions, based on Justice Grodin's own
observations, about how this law will continue to develop in the new

century.
16. Professor Emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles. A.B. 1937, University
of Michigan; LL.B. 1940, Harvard Law School. Executive Director and other positions,
National War Labor Board, 1942-1945. Director, Institute of Industrial Relations, 19601975. President, National Academy of Arbitrators, 1962. A widely-traveled visiting
professor both in the United States and abroad, Professor Aaron is the author of
numerous articles and at least four books on labor and employment law.
17. Professor Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall). A.B. 1938,
Harvard College; LL.B., 1941, Harvard Law School. Clerk for U.S. Supreme Court, 19481949. Associate General Counsel, United Steelworkers, 1949-1960; General Counsel,
United Steelworkers, 1961-1965. Partner, Goldberg, Feller & Bredhoff (and related
firms), Washington, D.C., 1955-1967. President, National Academy of Arbitrators, 1992.
Before the Supreme Court, Professor Feller argued and won The Steelworkers Trilogy, the
trio of landmark cases that established judicial deference to collectively-bargained
grievance and arbitration procedures. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
18. Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Stanford University.
A.B. 1958,
University of Rhode Island; LL.B. 1961, Cornell; LL.D. 1986, University of Rhode Island.
Assistant General Counsel, United Automobile Workers, Detroit, 1961-1962. Associate,
Battle, Fowler, Stokes & Kheel, New York, 1965-1968. Chairman, National Labor
Relations Board, 1994-98. A widely-traveled visiting professor both in the United States
and abroad, Professor Gould is the author of over 40 published articles and five books on
labor and employment law.
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11. The Career of Joseph R. Grodin
Shortly before graduating from the University of California at
Berkeley in 1951, young Joe Grodin was trying to decide whether to
study political economy in graduate school at Harvard. 19 At the
suggestion of a family friend, he met Mathew 0. Tobriner, then a
prominent labor lawyer in the San Francisco Bay Area. 20 As Grodin
recalled in his memoir, the two men "took an instant liking to one
another, and thereby began one of the most rewarding relationships
of his life."' 21 Thereafter, Tobriner became "a friend, a mentor,
and.., a substitute father" to Grodin, whose own father had died
when he was fourteen. 22
The first thing that meeting Tobriner changed in Grodin's life
was his choice of career. 23 At the urging of his new mentor, Grodin
enrolled at Yale Law School, a decision that he "never regretted...
for a minute." 24 At Yale, Grodin received a Fulbright grant to study
at the London School of Economics. 2 ' There, under the supervision
of Otto Kahn-Freund, he wrote a dissertation 26 which compared "the
rapidly developing British and American law relating to the
governance of labor unions. ' 27 That 28paper earned Grodin a
doctorate in labor law and labor relations.
Upon returning to California in 1955, the newly-minted Ph.D.
29
visited Tobriner in hope of getting a job at the mentor's law firm.
Grodin the scholar had planned a career in teaching law; first,
however, he wanted to play the role of Grodin the advocate by
practicing labor law for a few years. 30 Certainly, Tobriner's firm was
the right starting point.31 Expecting to receive an offer with Tobriner
& Lazarus, Grodin was disappointed to learn from his mentor that
the firm had just hired one lawyer and was not in a position to take on
19. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 5. Throughout this Part of the
Article, I make liberal use of the information contained in chapter 1 of this book,
especially pages 3-14.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 5-6.
22. Id. at 6.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. JOSEPH R. GRODIN, UNION GOVERNMENT AND THE LAW: BRITISH AND
AMERICAN EXPERIENCES (1961).
27. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 6.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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a second.3 2 So, Grodin found a job with another firm that, like
Tobriner's, represented labor organizations.3 3 When Grodin called
Tobriner to tell him the good news, the senior lawyer was irritated.'
"'You can't do that,' he said, confiding that the other firm was his
[main] competitor." 35 Grodin told his mentor that, although he was
aware of the competitive position of the two firms, he needed the job
because his wife, Janet, was pregnant, "and in all probability, the
baby would need to be fed and clothed. '36 Tobriner called Grodin
back that evening to inform him that there was room for him at
Tobriner & Lazarus after all.37 Grodin thus began what would
labor law
become a sixteen-year-long career, practicing union-side
38
with Tobriner & Lazarus and its various successors.
Working directly with Tobriner, Grodin undertook the usual law
firm chores: researching the law and writing memoranda, advising
clients, and planning and executing litigation strategy. 39 Grodin
described Tobriner's approach to the practice of law as "meticulous,
always insisting that he read the cases himself, and creative,
constantly in search of new ways to combine old principles. Above
all, he was a lawyer whose judgment was sound, because it was based
on the solid foundation of a mature, centered man. '40 In the years to
come, Grodin's own approach to the practice of law would follow
those very same principles.
Grodin observed the "odd alliance" between the thoughtful,
intellectual Tobriner and the rough-and-tumble Teamsters Union
officials whom he advised.41 Like Tobriner, Grodin believed in their
cause, but was hardly an ideologue. 42 As Grodin's own scholarship
would later reflect,43 mentor and mentee were keenly aware of the
limitations of the labor movement and of its leaders, especially when
44
it came to the internal union politics and the treatment of dissidents.
Neither was afraid to stand up for the rights of the individual workers,
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 6-7.
41. Id. at 7.
42. Id.
43. See Joseph R. Grodin & Duane B. Beeson, State Right-to-Work Laws and Federal
LaborPolicy, 52 CAL. L. REV. 95 (1964).
44. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 7.
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even if that meant offending powerful clients such as David
Dubinsky,45 the then president of the International Ladies' Garment
46
Workers Union.
In 1959, taking a path that one day would be followed by Grodin
himself, Tobriner was appointed by the newly-elected Governor
Edmund G. (Pat) Brown Sr. to the California Court of Appeal for the
First District. 47 The long-standing relationship between Tobriner and
Brown Sr. had begun when the two men were only in their boyhood.
The two had also worked together for the Democratic Party in San
Francisco since the New Deal. 48
The relationship would pay
dividends for both Tobriner and Grodin. In 1962, Justice Tobriner
was elevated by Brown Sr. to the California Supreme Court. 49 Along
the way, Tobriner would become friend and mentor to another
Brown: Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown Jr.50 During his turn as governor,
Brown Jr., at Justice Tobriner's urging, would appoint Grodin to take
practically the same seats on the state judiciary that had been
occupied by their mutual mentor.51
In the years that followed, Grodin the advocate represented not
only union clients for a fee but also civil rights and community
organizations on a pro bono basis. 52 By his own account, he
performed some of his most rewarding legal work for the ACLU and
the NAACP.53 By 1971, however, he felt that his practice had
reached "a point of diminishing returns. '54 He took a year's leave of
absence to teach Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, and Labor
Law at the University of Oregon Law School.55 Grodin the scholar
enjoyed his return to the academic life so much that, the next year, he
joined the full-time faculty at Hastings College of Law, where he
remained-except for brief stints as a visiting professor at Stanford
and as a member of the inaugural Agricultural Labor Relations
56
Board-until he was appointed to the bench.
45. The colorful Dubinsky, a member of the Communist Party who ran the
International Ladies' Garment Workers Union for thirty four years, was used to getting
his way.
46. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 7.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 8.
50. Id. at 10.
51. Id. at 10-11.
52. Id. at 8.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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Tobriner and Grodin remained close. From the time Tobriner
left the bar for the bench in 1959 until shortly before his death in
1982, the two men kept a weekly lunch date.57 Over Justice
Tobriner's staple beverage-an "all-around chocolate soda"-they
discussed not only their personal lives but also the big questions of
law with which the mentor grappled on the bench.58 A byproduct of
their conversations was a co-written article for the California Law
Review59 that traced the development of legal principles protecting
individuals against arbitrary action by private centers of power.60 By
private centers of power, the pair meant non-government institutions
whose decisions and actions often have as great an impact on the
individual as the decisions and actions of government institutions
such as corporate employers, labor unions, religious groups,
insurance companies and the like. Their thesis was that the decisions
and actions of such institutions affect the public interest and,
therefore, are, and should, be regulated to mitigate the adverse
consequences they inflict upon individuals, much as government
61
institutions are so regulated.
In 1979, Professor and Janet Grodin were on an eight-day raft
trip down the Colorado River when the call to the judiciary came. 62
At the front desk of their Grand Canyon motel, "a Jerry Brown" had
left a message saying that, if Professor Grodin was unable to reach
him directly, he should contact "a Tony Kline"-Anthony Kline, the
then judicial appointments secretary to Brown Jr., who is now a
Justice on the Court of Appeal himself.63 Grodin, however, managed
to contact Brown Jr. and accept the appointment. 64 After the usual
confirmation process was completed some months later, Grodin took
the bench as a Justice of the First District Court of Appeal in San
Francisco. 65
Justice Grodin enjoyed his work as an appellate judge. 66 That
experience, coupled with his mentor's counsel, whetted his appetite
for a spot on the California Supreme Court. In November 1982, that
57. Id.at 9.
58. Id.
59. Mathew 0. Tobriner & Joseph R. Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service
Enterprise in the New IndustrialState, 55 CAL. L. REv. 1247 (1967).
60. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 9.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See generally Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 59.
GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11-13.
See id. at 15-32.
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opportunity came too.67 With barely two months remaining in his
second and final term as governor, Jerry Brown elevated Grodin the
jurist to the state's highest court. 68 As Grodin's memoirs recount, he
remained on the State Supreme Court until the disastrous 1986
69
retention election that turned him out of judicial office.
As a member of two of the most closely-watched appellate courts
in the country, Justice Grodin wrote the majority opinion in at least
twenty three labor and employment law decisions,70 including the
landmark implied contract case of Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.71 He
also wrote concurring opinions in six other decisions, 72 and,
remarkably, no dissents. A summary of these opinions appears in
73
Appendix A.
As a scholar, Professor Grodin has authored eight books, 74
76
fifteen law review articles,75 and six other published commentaries,
at least one of which continues to appear as a standard citation in
77 A summary of
California decisions concerning public employment.
78
B.
Appendix
in
appears
these publications
It is to a discussion of this output, and to its influence on the
development of California's law of the workplace, that I now turn.
II. Grodin's Four Contributions to the Law of the Workplace
Drawing mainly upon his substantial body of published opinion
and scholarship, I identify the four most important contributions by
Joseph R. Grodin to the development of the law of the workplace in
this State. These include his roles as (1) the leading critic of the
presumption of at-will employment; (2) a pioneer in the study of
labor relations in the public sector; (3) a participant in the

67. Id. at 46.
68. Id.
69. For a complete discussion of judicial elections in general and the 1986 retention
election in particular, see id. at 162-86.
70. See infra app. A.
71. 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981).
72. See infra app. A.
73. See infra app. A.
74. See infra app. B.
75. See infra app. B.
76. See infra app. B.
77. See Joseph R. Grodin, Public Employee Bargainingin California: The MeyersMilias-Brown Act in the Courts, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 719 (1972) [hereinafter Grodin, The
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts].
78. See infra app. B.
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implementation of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act; and (4) a
skeptic of mandatory arbitration in individual employment disputes.
A. The Leading Critic of the Rule of At-Will Employment

Whether one agrees that the demise of the at-will employment
rule is good policy, there is no denying that any discussion of the
subject must begin with an opinion by Grodin the jurist: his 1981
decision for the First District Court of Appeal in Pugh v. See's
79
Candies,Inc.
Pugh remains the standard citation for the doctrine that the
presumption codified in California Labor Code section 2922 0 -that
an agreement for an indefinite term of employment is presumed to be
at will, and, therefore, terminable at the pleasure of either party-can
be overcome if the employee pleads and proves the existence of an
implied-in-fact contract not to terminate except for good cause. 8' As
of February 15, 2000, Pugh had been cited for this proposition in 295
decisions, twenty two of which followed it as controlling or persuasive
authority.82 The California Supreme Court reaffirmed Pugh in Foley
v. Interactive Data Corp.,83 the landmark 1988 decision that clarified
the law of wrongful termination in California.
By comparison, Justice Tobriner's 1980 decision in Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co.,84 the other famous pre-Foley case, had been
cited in 391 decisions, twenty two of which followed it as controlling
or persuasive authority. 85 Of course, one should expect Tameny to be
cited more often than Pugh. After all, Tameny was a decision by the
California Supreme Court, whereas Justice Grodin was writing only
for the California Court of Appeal in Pugh.
If it is true that hard cases make bad law, then perhaps Pugh is
an example of an easy case making good law. The story is now a
familiar one to the labor and employment bar. "After 32 years of
79. 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981).
80. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989).
81. Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
82. Search of LEXIS, Shepard's Library (Feb. 15,2000).
83. 765 P.2d 373 passim (Cal. 1988). Foley clarified the contours of the three principal
exceptions to the at-will rule: termination in violation of public policy, which the
California Supreme Court had adopted in Tameny v. Atd. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330
(Cal. 1980); termination in breach of an implied-in-fact contract, which was established by
Justice Grodin in Pugh; and termination in breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing implied in every contract, which had been articulated in Cleary v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722,728 (Ct. App. 1980).
84. 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
85. Search of LEXIS, Shepard's Library (Feb. 15,2000).
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employment.., in which he worked his way up the corporate ladder
'86
from dishwasher to vice-president... , Wayne Pugh was fired.
87
Pugh had never been given formal or written criticism of his work.
See's neither had notified Pugh of any performance problems nor had
told him that he needed to improve his performance. 8a Furthermore,
Pugh had never been the target of complaints by other employees, the
management, or any customers. 89 In addition, he had never been
denied a raise or a bonus.90 Instead, from the earliest days on the job,
the company's president had told Pugh, "[I]f you are loyal to [See's]
and do a good job, your future is secure." 91
Upon termination, Pugh brought an action against both See's
92
and the union representing the company's production employees.
He pleaded two theories of wrongful termination. First, Pugh
claimed that his termination violated public policy because he was
fired in retaliation for having complained that the company's labor
relations practices violated antitrust and other laws.93 Second, he
asserted that he was fired in breach of an implied contract not to
94
terminate except for good cause, which he contended was lacking.
Upon the company's motion for nonsuit, the trial court dismissed the
case, and Pugh appealed. 95
Writing for the panel of the court of appeal, Justice Grodin
quickly disposed of the public policy claim 96 on the ground that Pugh
had not offered enough evidence to establish that he was an intended
beneficiary of the statutes that he claimed had been offended by his
termination. 97 Instead, Justice Grodin focused on the implied contract
86. Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
87. Id. at 919.
88. Id. at 919-20.
89. Id. at 919.
90. Id.
91. Id. (modification in original)
92. Id. at 918.
93. Id. at 922-23.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The next year, in Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Ct. App. 1982), Justice
Grodin would find a separate opportunity to elaborate his views on the public policy
exception.
97. Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 922-24. Pugh contended that he was the victim of
retaliatory termination in three respects: First, he was fired for refusing to participate in
negotiations for a union contract that would have violated state and federal policy against
restraint of trade; second, he was fired for refusing to participate in negotiations for a
union contract that violated declared public policy against sex discrimination; and third, he
was fired in violation of state policy favoring the exercise of a company director's duty of
inquiry. Id. at 922.
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claim. He found that the employer's motion for nonsuit should have
been denied because Pugh had proved facts sufficient to make out a
cause pursuant to an
prima facie case of failure to terminate for
98
implied-in-fact contract between the parties.
The genius of Justice Grodin's opinion in Pugh was that it
charted new territory simply by drawing the map as though it were
covering familiar landscape. To Justice Grodin, the facts of Pugh
presented an opportunity to resolve a discrete problem in the law of
contracts-not, as we might imagine today, a chance to rewrite
employment law. Certainly, Justice Grodin was critical of the logic
behind section 2922.99 Ten years later, in an article for the Hastings
Law Journal,he would argue that the at-will rule should be abolished
by statute because it is out of step with most workers' reasonable
expectation of how they should be treated. 1°°
But Justice Grodin did not attempt to overturn section 2922.
Instead, he took up the less controversial task of applying the existing
statute to the facts of Pugh's employment contract. The thesis he
developed began this way: "The presumption that an employment
contract is intended to be terminable at will is subject, like any other
presumption, to contrary evidence."''1 1
Justice Grodin devoted most of the balance of his majority
opinion to explaining why a jury could reasonably conclude that Pugh
had offered enough "contrary evidence" to overcome the
presumption set forth in section 2922.102 "The duration of [Pugh's]
employment, the commendations and promotions he received, the
apparent lack of any direct criticism of his work, the assurances he
was given, and the employer's acknowledged [tenure] policies" were
all important factors that supported a finding of an implied-in-fact
contract not to terminate except for good cause. 10 3 Today, these
factors have become the standard material subject to discovery in
litigation involving at-will termination of employment.
What is less remembered about the opinion, is that before he
could address the record, Justice Grodin had to arrange decent
burials for two rules of law that had long been dead in every other

98. Id at 927.
99. Id. at 921-22; CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 2000).
100. Joseph Grodin, Toward a Wrongful Termination Statute for California, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 135,136-38 (1990).
101. Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
102. Id. at 924-28.
103. Id.at 927.
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area of contract law except employment contracts.1 4 These were the
doctrines of "mutuality of obligation" and "independent
consideration." 105
In contract law, "mutuality of obligation" refers to the notion
that there must be an "equivalence" in the values exchanged by the
parties to a bargain. 1°6 A promise that was binding on one party but
not on the other was said to lack mutuality at common law and was,
therefore, unenforceable. Beginning in the late nineteenth century,
courts began recognizing that a promise not to terminate except for
good cause lacked mutuality of obligation because it restricted the
employer's right to fire an employee without correspondingly
restricting an employee's right to quit.107 Even an employee who
agreed to such a restriction was protected by the Thirteenth
Amendment, 10 8 which, in abolishing conditions of servitude,
effectively left an employer without a remedy if an employee later
reneged on a promise not to quit.
Justice Grodin disposed of nearly a century of mutuality
problems for plaintiffs like Pugh by relying upon a rule long applied,
without hesitation, to non-employment contracts-namely, that
mutuality is irrelevant if the requirement of consideration is
109 and the Restatement
otherwise met. He cited Corbin on Contracts
(Second) of Contracts ° for the proposition that the mutuality of
obligation requirement was old news in contract law."' He thus
dismissed the first legal challenge to Pugh's implied contract claim.
Next, he addressed the "independent consideration" doctrine.
Independent consideration refers to the notion that a promise for
continued employment subject to a limitation upon the employer's
power to terminate must be supported by consideration other than
104. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of
Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment At Will, 52 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1082, 1098-99 (1984) [hereinafter Summers, FairRepresentationand Employment At
Wiln.
105. Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924-25.
106. Id. at 924.
107. See, e.g., Meadows v. Radio Indus., 222 F.2d 347, 348-49 (7th Cir. 1955); Hope v.
Nat. Airlines, Inc., 99 So. 2d 244, 244-46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957). For historical
background, see also Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom:
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1419-20
(1967) [hereinafter Blades, Employment At Will vs. IndividualFreedom].
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
109. IA ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152, at 13-17 (1963)
[hereinafter CORBIN ON CONTRACTS].
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1965).
111. Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
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the employment services to be rendered." 2 This requirement was
curious because the principle consideration that every employee
offers is his services-a fact that effectively undermines even an

express intention by an employer to bargain away the presumption of
3
at-will employment."
Justice Grodin disposed of the problem of independent
consideration by relying on the principle long-established in other
areas of contract law-that courts should not inquire into the
adequacy of consideration." 4 Here, too, Justice Grodin relied on
Corbin and concluded that "there is no analytical reason why an
employee's promise to render services, or his actual rendition of
services over time, may not support an employer's promise both to
pay a particular wage (for example) and to refrain from arbitrary
dismissal."" 5
Pugh is a good example of Justice Grodin's influence on the
California employment law. Over the years, many of us in the law
academy have criticized the at-will rule in books and law review
articles. 116 Unlike others, however, Justice Grodin drew upon existing
112. See generally Ruinello v. Murray, 227 P.2d 251, 253 (Cal. 1951); Speegle v. Bd. of
Fire Underwriters of the Pac., 172 P.2d 867, 870 (Cal. 1946); Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 92425; Levy v. Belmar Enter., 50 Cal. Rptr. 842, 844 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Ferreyra v. E. & J.
Gallo Winery, 41 Cal. Rptr. 819, 822 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
113. See generally Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925; Blades, Employment At Will vs.
Individual Freedom, supra note 107, at 1419-20. For illuminating examples of how this
used to work, see generally Ferreyra,41 Cal. Rptr. at 820-23 (declaring employment term
to be indefinite even though written correspondence declared term to be "permanent");
Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 266 N.W. 872, 873-74 (Minn. 1936) (declaring
employment term to be indefinite even though oral promise declared term to be
"permanent").
114. Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
115. Id. (citing CORBIN ON CONTRACrS, supra note 109, § 125, at 535 (noting that "[a]
single and undivided consideration may be bargained for and given as the agreed
equivalent of one promise or of two promises or of many promises")).
116. See, e.g., Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom, supra note 107; Jay
M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT.
118 (1976); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment-At-Will Rule Revisited,
23 ARiZ. ST. L.L 733 (1991); Pauline T. Kim, Bargainingwith Imperfect Information: A
Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL. L.
REV. 105 (1997); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning,and Law: Exploring the Influences on
Workers' Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447 (1999); Summers, Fair
Representationand Employment At Will, supra note 104; Clyde W. Summers, Individual
ProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); Note,
ProtectingAt Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in
Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980). But see, e.g., Richard Epstein, In Defense of
the ContractAt Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984) (offering economic analysis of why the
at-will rule reflects sound policy); Note, ProtectingEmployees At Will Against Wrongful
Discharge: The PubicPolicy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983) (analyzing judicial
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and well-established doctrines of contract law in rejecting a
conclusive presumption of at-will employment. Thus, his opinion in
Pugh has become the leading statement of the law of at-will
employment.
B.

A Pioneer in the Study of the Law Affecting Public Employment
Joseph Grodin has influenced California public employment law

in at least two respects. First, during the 1970's-the same period that
unions were enjoying great success in their efforts to organize

government sector workers-Grodin the scholar began producing a
great deal of scholarship on public employment law. Second, Grodin
the jurist authored at least ten majority opinions and four concurring
opinions for the California Court of Appeal and the California
11 7
Supreme Court in this area.

(1) Grodin'sScholarship on Public Employment Law
In 1975,118 1979,119 and 1993,120 Professor Grodin co-edited the
second, third, and fourth editions of the Collective Bargaining in
Public Employment, one of a series of text books produced by The

Labor Law Group, a well-regarded circle of the country's leading
labor law scholars. Furthermore, in 1979121 and 1988,122 he co-edited
the first and second editions of the Public Sector Bargaining, a

collection of research on collective bargaining law and policy in
government employment. Both series can be found on the shelf at
the local law library.

Meanwhile, Professor Grodin began producing the first of seven
articles on public sector labor law. 123 Of these, the most influential is
reluctance to make public policy exception more broadly available to low- and middleincome workers).
117. See infra app. A.
118. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT (Joseph R. Grodin &

Donald H. Wollett eds., 2d ed. 1975).
119. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT (Joseph R. Grodin et al.
eds., 3d ed. 1979).
120. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT (Donald H. Wollett et al.

eds., 4th ed. 1993).
121. PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING (Benjamin Aaron et al. eds., 1979).
122. BENJAMIN AARON ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING (2d ed. 1988).

123. See Joseph R. Grodin & Mark A. Hardin, Public Employee Bargainingin Oregon,
51 OR. L. REV. 7 (1971); Joseph R. Grodin, Either-Or Arbitration for Public Employee
Disputes, 11 INDUS. REL. 260 (1972); Grodin, The Meyers-Millias-BrownAct in the Courts,
supra note 77; Joseph R. Grodin, California Public Employee BargainingRevisited: The
MMB Act in the Appellate Courts,21 CAL. PUB. EMP. REP. (CPER) 2 (1974); Joseph R.
Grodin, Arbitration of PublicSector Disputes: The Nevada Experiment,28 INDUS. & LAB.
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his 1972 article on the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act 24 ("MMBA") for
the Hastings Law Journal.- 5 The MMBA was California's first
attempt to codify collective bargaining rights for the local government
employees. Although the article is critical of the MMBA for
providing little guidance on the intricacies of collective bargaining to
the courts, it is frequently cited by the courts precisely because the
article's comprehensive section-by-section description of the law
provides some of the guidance that the MMBA lacks. In fact, the
MMBA piece is the single most frequently cited authority on how the
statute works. It has been cited in forty-five appellate decisions,
including thirteen decisions by the California Supreme Court and
l 6
thirty-one by the California courts of appeal."

The MMBA article was ambitious for its attempt to critique the
operation of a law that had generated "a considerable volume of
litigation" but few published appellate decisions. 2 7 So, Grodin the
scholar borrowed a page from Grodin the advocate. Because the law
assigned jurisdiction over disputes to the superior courts, he would
turn to the unreported decisions and orders of those courts for a

glimpse of how those courts were attempting to interpret and apply
the statute. Professor Grodin examined the files of eighteen cases
decided by the superior court judges, which he thought were

"probably representative" of the disputes that had been litigated until

then.- 8
Ironically, Professor Grodin's greatest fears about the MMBA
have not come to pass. For example, he worried that the statute
might be interpreted to undermine the very purpose it was enacted to
REL. REV. 89 (1974); Joseph R. Grodin, Political Aspects of Public Sector Interest
Arbitration,64 CAL. LAv REv. 678 (1976); Joseph R. Grodin, CaliforniaPublic Employee
Bargaining: The MMB Act in Relation to Local Charters and Ordinances, 36 CAL. PUB.
EMP.REP.(CPER) 2 (1978).
124. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3500 (West 1995).
125. Grodin, The Meyers-Milias-BrownAct in the Courts,supra note 77.
126. Search of LEXIS, Shepard's Library (Feb. 15, 2000). The article is so widely
known that it was recently included as one of eight pieces that the Hastings Law Journal
reprinted as part of a special issue celebrating fifty years of publication. See Joseph R.
Grodin, Public Employee Bargainingin California: The Meyers-Milias-BrownAct in the
Courts, 50 HASTINGS. L.J. 717 (1999). See also Joseph R. Grodin, Author's Comments to
Public Employee Bargainingin California: The Meyers-Milias-BrownAct in the Courts, 50
HASTINGS. L.J. 761, 761 (1999) (observing that "[l]t is more than a quarter of a century
since I wrote my piece on the [MMBA], and what is most surprising is how little has
changed.") (footnote omitted). Among the distinguished authors whose articles were
reprinted alongside Professor Grodin's were William Brennan, Potter Stewart, Roger
Traynor, and William Prosser.
127. See Grodin, The Meyers-Milias-BrownAct in the Courts,supra note 77, at 722.
128. Id.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

serve. 129 The MMBA's preamble states the statute's purpose is to
promote improved personnel management and labor relations "by
providing a uniform basis for recognizing the right of public
'
employees to join organizations of their own choice. "130
But, it also
provides that nothing in the statute "shall be deemed to supersede the
provisions of existing state law and the charters, ordinances, and rules
of local public agencies which establish and regulate a merit or civil
service system or which provide for other methods of administering
employer-employee relations."'13'
Read literally, the preamble
language could mean that the law is permissive rather than
mandatory, in which case a municipality might adopt an ordinance
denying or severely limiting the rights of firefighters, peace officers,
132
or professional employees to form and join labor organizations.
Instead, the state's appellate courts have held that, to the extent local
33
law is restrictive of employee rights, it is preempted.
Professor Grodin also worried that the MMBA's lack of any
formal, neutral mechanism for either recognizing bargaining
representatives or determining which employees belong to what
134
bargaining units would hamper administration of the new law.
Unlike the state's labor laws governing public sector education, the
MMBA does not provide for the adjudication of disputes by any
administrative agency, such as the Public Employment Relations
Board ("PERB"). This worry too has proved to be unfounded.
Although difficult questions of proper recognition and unit
determination have arisen, these questions have been resolved at the
135
local level, sometimes with assistance from the superior courts.
(2) Grodin'sJudicial Opinions in the Area of Public Employment Law
Of Justice Grodin's fourteen appellate opinions regarding public
employment law, the most important was his concurring opinion in
the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in El Rancho Unified School
129. Id. at 724.
130. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3500 (emphasis added).
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. See Grodin, The Meyers-Milias-BrownAct in the Courts,supra note 77, at 724.
133. See, e.g., Voters for Responsible Ret. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 884 P.2d 645, 655-56,
(Cal. 1994).
134. Grodin, The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts, supra note 77, at 729, 732-33,
736.
135. See, e.g., Santa Clara County Dist. Attorney Investigators Ass'n v. Santa Clara
County, 124 Cal. Rptr. 115, 119-22 (Ct. App. 1975) (appropriate recognition question);
Alameda County Assistant Pub. Defenders Ass'n v. County of Alameda, 109 Cal. Rptr.
392, 396 (Ct. App. 1973) (reasonable bargaining unit question).
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District v. National Education Association.136 In that case, Justice
Grodin agreed with the majority that the superior court's jurisdiction
to entertain an action for damages arising out of a teachers' strike was
preempted by PERB's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices. 137 He
wrote separately to take issue with another concurring opinion, by
Justice Frank Richardson, 138 who contended that a strike by public
employees was illegal. The common law of most states, including that
of California at the time, forbade public employee strikes on the
ground that public employees are in a position to wield unfair
monopoly and political power vis-h-vis government employers.
Justice Grodin thought that the public employee strike was
lawful not based his personal predilection, but rather due to actions
by the California Legislature that had "cast substantial doubt upon
the continuing validity" of the common law rule. 139 Grodin's opinion
considered three developments: first, the common law roots of the
state's no-strike rule; second, the policy reasons supporting that rule
as explained by commentators; and third, the enactment of collective
bargaining legislation for public school employees, which had
"substantially undermined, if not obliterated," the first two.140 The
performance was vintage Grodin. He moved conservatively, by
increments, and with meticulous attention to the main counterarguments; in so doing, he left little room for rebuttal.
Justice Grodin's careful explanation as to why public employees
should have the right to strike became the law two years later in a
1985 decision by the California Supreme Court. In County Sanitation
District No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Association,141 the
Supreme Court, writing through Justice Broussard, relied partly on
Justice Grodin's El Rancho concurrence. 142 It held that a strike by
public employees is not unlawful unless the work stoppage poses an
"imminent threat" to the public's health or safety.143

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

663 P.2d 893, 903-04 (Cal. 1983).
Id. at 903 (Grodin, J., concurring).
Id (Richardson, J., concurring in judgment).
IL- (Grodin, J., concurring).
Id at 904 (Grodin, J., concurring).
699 P.2d 835, 850 (Cal. 1985).
I at 839 (citing El Rancho, 663 P.2d at 904 (Grodin, J., concurring)).
Id at 850.
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A Participant in the Development of Law Under Agricultural Labor
Relations Act

The genesis of Joseph Grodin's participation in the development
of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act ("ALRA")144-the nation's
first comprehensive farm labor law-was his seven-month
membership on the inaugural Agricultural Labor Relations Board
("ALRB" or "Board") in 1975-76. Grodin neither sought the
appointment nor knew that it was coming.1 45 The move was typical
for Jerry Brown, the governor who appointed him. Grodin joked that
the news came from a Royal Canadian Mountie who found him and
146
his wife Janet while they were backpacking in the British Columbia.
Whatever the circumstances, Grodin joined the ALRB at an
historic moment in California's long history of farm labor strife.
After a decade-long struggle, 147 Cesar Chavez and the United Farm
Workers (UFW) had finally won passage of the ALRA. The new
statute established the rights of farm workers to form and join unions
and to engage in collective bargaining.1 48 Although it was modeled
after the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 149 the ALRA was
hardly a cookie cutter replica. As Professor Grodin outlined in an
introduction to a 1978 U.C. Davis Law Review symposium on the
subject, a number of the statute's provisions were designed to
accommodate the seasonal and migratory nature of farm labor in
California. 150 The first ALRB was to set up shop and decide how best
to implement the ALRA. As the one appointee with expertise in
labor law, Grodin lent a much-needed guiding hand during this
process.
Today, Grodin's short tenure on the ALRB seems less important
for what he did while serving on the Board than for what it inspired
him to do afterward. After leaving the Board, he produced two law
review articles and four appellate opinions that have had a significant
impact on the statute's interpretation. Of these, the most important
144.
145.
146.
147.

CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-1166.3 (West 1989).
GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 5.
Id.
For a thoughtful look at this struggle, see generally SUSAN FERRISS & RICARDO

SANDOVAL,

THE FIGHT IN THE FIELDS: CESAR CHAVEZ AND THE FARMWORKERS

MOVEMENT 190-205 (1997). For the perspective of a law professor who helped draft the
statute, see Herman M. Levy, The Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975-La
Esperanza de Californiapara el Futuro, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 783 (1975).
148. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-1166.3.

149. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1998).
150. Joseph R. Grodin, Introduction to Farm Labor Law, 11 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 201
(1978).
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were his majority opinions for the California Supreme Court in a pair
of unfair labor practices cases brought against grower Harry Carian.
In his 1984 decision in Carian v. ALRB (Carian 1), 151 Justice
Grodin considered the ALRB's authority to promulgate rules
regulating the conduct of the organizing campaign that precedes the
election of a union representative. In particular, he held that the
ALRB has the power to order the grower to furnish the union with an
Excelsior 52-type list of employees' names, home addresses, and other
contact information before the agency schedules an election. In
Excelsior-type disclosures after
contrast, the NLRB practice required
153
that agency scheduled an election.
Furthermore, in his 1985 opinion in Harry CarianSales v. ALRB
(Carian II),154 Justice Grodin addressed the ALRB's authority to
adjudicate an employer's pre-election misconduct. The Board found
that the grower had committed thirty unfair labor practices which
included surveillance of union activities, interrogation of employees,
threats of discharge and deportation, discriminatory hires, layoffs and
terminations, acts of violence against union organizers, an illegal
wage increase, and coercive election-eve promises. In an opinion by
Justice Grodin, the court held not only that substantial evidence
supported the Board's unfair labor practice findings, but also that the
agency had sweeping powers to remedy such violations, including the
authority to certify a collective bargaining representative and to issue
a Gissel' 55 bargaining order, even though the union had never won a
secret ballot election. 156 Although the NLRB has similar authority, it
has rarely used it.
The Carian cases are important not only because they establish
basic law under the ALRA, but also because they demonstrate the
traditional, if not conservative, brand of decision-making that Justice
Grodin brought to the judiciary. Grodin the jurist is a traditionalist in
two ways. First, his opinions take care to articulate and address each
counter-argument that has been marshaled against the position he

151. 685 P.2d 701 (Cal. 1984).
152. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966) (requiring employer facing
organizing election to furnish union with identities of employees in bargaining unit).
153. CarianI, 685 P.2d at 708-10.
154. 703 P.2d 27 (Cal. 1985).
155. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610 (1969) (affirming NLRB's
authority to issue remedial bargaining order where employer has committed unfair labor
practices "which have made the holding of a fair election unlikely or which have in fact
undermined a union's majority and caused an election to be set aside").
156. Carian11,703 P.2d at 42.
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For

example, in CarianII, the grower raised five separate arguments as to
why the ALRB lacked the authority to issue a Gissel order. To rebut
each one, Justice Grodin's thirty-page majority opinion devoted no
fewer than eleven pages to an examination of the statute's language,
legislative history, and reliance on NLRB precedents. 158 The grower

also raised four arguments as to why a Gissel order was not
appropriate in his case.

To rebut these arguments, his opinion

devoted nine more pages, 159 including a balanced consideration of the
argument that authorization cards signed by Carian employees should

be taken as evidence of their desire for an election in general, rather
than as their wish for UFW representation in particular.1 60 It is a
Grodin trademark to acknowledge, as he did in that case, 161 that an

argument has "some merit" before gently setting it aside.162

Second, Justice Grodin's opinions tend to be narrowly written.

They take care to say what is not being decided and rarely go in for
dicta.1 63 For example, in Carian I, the grower complained that the

ALRB went too far by attempting to regulate the content of the
Excelsior list for substantial compliance.

In siding with the Board,

Grodin wrote: "We do not mean to suggest that the Board may find
an employer guilty of an unfair labor practice when the employer has
157. See, e.g., Nish Noroian Farms v. ALRB, 677 P.2d 1170, 1175-80 (Cal. 1984)
(interpreting prior settlement agreement and analyzing duty to bargain); Carpenters 46 N.
Cal. Counties Conference Bd. v. Valentine, 182 Cal. Rptr. 500, 503-05 (Ct. App. 1982)
(confirming arbitration award issued pursuant to collective bargaining agreement);
Bertuccio v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. Rptr. 411, 415-17 (Ct. App. 1981) (analyzing the
scope of picketing injunction); Santillano v. State Pers. Bd., 173 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (Ct. App.
1981) (analyzing an employee's status as probationary employee).
158. CarianII, 703 P.2d at 34-42.
159. Id. at 43-48.
160. Id. at 45.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 166 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that "[w]hile the question is a difficult one, we conclude upon analysis that the position
taken by Hentzel and the division is correct").
163. See, e.g., Evans v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 703 P.2d 122, 133 (Cal. 1985)
(noting that "[t]hus we need not address petitioners' argument that the Board is required
to follow departmental policy as set out in EDD directives"); San Jose Teachers Ass'n v.
Superior Court, 700 P.2d 1252, 1269 n.16 (Cal. 1985) (noting that "[w]e need not, and do
not, decide whether similar preemption principles should apply"); Campbell Mun.
Employees Ass'n v. City of Campbell, 182 Cal. Rptr. 461, 464 (Ct. App. 1982) (noting that
"[t]he facts of this case make it unnecessary to resolve that issue"); Hayworth v. City of
Oakland, 181 Cal. Rptr. 214, 220 n.4 (Ct. App. 1982) (noting that "[w]e are reluctant to
provide specific guidance on this issue because it has not been briefed or argued, and
because its outcome may depend upon facts not yet determined by the trial court or upon
considerations not brought to our attention").
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made a reasonable and good faith attempt to comply with the
requirements of the rule." 164
Although he served on the California Supreme Court during the
tenure of Chief Justice Rose Bird, when one might have expected the
frequent revisiting of settled law, Justice Grodin's labor and
employment decisions do not fit the mold of an activist engaged in
judicial overreaching. In fact, in twenty-three reported labor and
employment law decisions, Justice Grodin wrote just once'to overrule
5
and just once more to disapprove it.166
precedent 16
D. A Skeptic of Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Disputes

In what may prove to be his most important contribution to our
field yet, Joe Grodin has produced thoughtful scholarship that
analyzes the shortcomings attending the judicial enforcement of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements, which are so hotly
debated by law commentators today. 67
To illustrate his point, Professor Grodin used an analogy that is
familiar to those of us living in Earthquake Country. In a 1998 law
review article for the Berkeley Journal of Employment & Labor
Law, 168 he wrote that it is useful to think of labor law and
employment law as alternative and complementary ways of regulating
the workplace. Whereas labor law is designed to institutionalize the
164. Carianv. ALRB (CarianI), 685 P.2d 701,711 (Cal. 1984).
165. Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc., 702 P.2d 212, 218-19 (Cal. 1985) (overruling Kroger v.
Baur, 117 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1941), which had held that action for fraud may not be maintained
where allegedly fraudulent promise is unenforceable due to statute of frauds).
166. Sanchez v. Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 685 P.2d 61, 70 (Cal. 1984)
(disapproving Warriner v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 108 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Ct. App.
1973), to the extent that it was inconsistent with the court's holding that a worker who is
subject to illegal discrimination has "good cause" to leave employment and collect
unemployment benefits so long as she reasonably and in good faith believes discrimination
will continue).
167. Compare Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contractof the 1990s, 73 DENY. U.L. Rnv. 1017,
1018 (1996) (criticizing mandatory arbitration because "[y]our rights are only enforceable
in a system of private justice, in a forum crafted by your employer and foisted upon you
without any real bargaining or choice"), with Roberto L. Corrada, Claiming Private Law
for the Left: Exploring Gilmer's Impact and Legacy, 73 DENV. U.L. REV. 1051, 1053
(1996) (arguing not only that Professor Stone's concerns are inapplicable to most
moderate income employees but also that "more justice might be achieved for more
people if the left decides to work... in a progressive way [for arbitration reform] rather
fight it").
168. Joseph R. Grodin, On the Interface Between Labor and Employment Law, 19
BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 307,307 (1998).
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mechanism of governance through private collective bargaining,

employment law tends to establish numerous mechanisms for
governance through state regulation. These regimes coexist in both
union and non-union workplaces. But "like the interaction of
tectonic plates moving underneath the earth's surface," their contact
"gives rise to the legal equivalent of earthquakes and volcanic
69
eruptions."1

In Professor Grodin's view, the seismic events in employment
law have now gathered around the institution of arbitration.
Especially volatile have been the issues of whether and to what extent
the existence of arbitration procedures might affect the rights of an
individual employee to assert certain claims under external law

independently of that procedure.
Grodin has made no bones about the fact that he believes that
courts should deny enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration

agreements outside the collective bargaining and commercial law
contexts. 170 At the least, he insists that their enforcement be
conditioned upon a finding that the employee's waiver of a judicial
form was "knowing and voluntary"- 7 1-a position adopted by the
United States Supreme Court for collective bargaining agreements in
172
its 1998 decision in Wright v. UniversalMaritime Corp.
Of course, the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements outside the collective bargaining arena is the subject of a
split among the circuits, and their resolution remains uncertain. 173 In

169. Id.
170. See Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment DiscriminationClaims: Doctrine
and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HoFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 2 (1996) [hereinafter
Grodin, Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer].
171. Id. at 2-3, 36-39.
172. 525 U.S. 70,82 (1998).
173. Compare Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998)
(declining to enforce mandatory pre-dispute arbitration of Title VII and state law
discrimination claims as against public policy), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 982 (1998); Paladino
v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 1998) (declining to enforce same
with respect to Title VII claims); Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d
1126 (7th Cir. 1997) (declining to enforce same with respect to Title VII and ADA claims
due to lack of consideration), with Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir.
1999) (finding pre-dispute arbitration agreements enforceable but refusing to enforce this
agreement due to material breach by employer); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175
(3d Cir. 1998) (enforcing same with respect to Title VII and ADEA claims), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1139 (1999); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997)
(enforcing same); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (enforcing
same); Metz v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994)
(finding same enforceable but not in this case because employer waived arbitration);
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the hope of influencing the resolution of this conflict, Professor
Grodin has raised three concerns. First, the institutional biases of
private arbitration, such as limitations on discovery and class claims,
favor employers over employees. 7 4 Second, a regime of policing such
agreements for fairness, while not impossible, poses serious
jurisprudential and practical problems. 7 5 Third, notwithstanding
recent treatment of the subject by the U.S. Supreme Court,176 there
exists an unavoidable tension between two implacable forces in our
democratic society: private dispute resolution procedures, which
emphasize privacy and finality, and public norms, which emphasize
compensating individuals for legally sanctioned wrongs.177
It seems to me that any argument for the general enforcement of
pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the non-union setting must
persuasively address Professor Grodin's concerns before it can
become the settled law of the land. It remains to be seen whether the
Supreme Court will do so in the near future.178
M. Forecasting the Future of California's Law of the
Workplace
Those of us who practice, adjudicate, and study labor and
employment issues tend to think of Joe Grodin as one of our own.
However, he has long pursued broader interests. He also teaches and
writes about constitutional law. Grodin's teaching in this area centers
around a topic that also was of special interest to his mentor Justice
Tobriner: the tension between exercising individual freedoms and
preserving the system of collective governance that secures and
protects those freedoms. 7 9
Grodin the scholar has referred to settled constitutional
principles to explain developments in California's law of the
workplace. The most important of these references, made in the form
of a report about his study of the relationship between the private and
Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991) (enforcing same); Alford
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991) (enforcing same).
174. Grodin, Doctrineand Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, supra note 170, at 52.

175. Id.
176. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (enforcing
arbitration agreement governing employment disputes between securities brokerage and
broker).
177. Grodin, Doctrineand Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, supranote 170, at 53.
178. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999)
(declining to apply Federal Arbitration Act in an action to enforce arbitration clause
contained in employment agreement), cert. granted,120 S. Ct. 2004 (2000).
179. See, e.g., GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 9-10.
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public sector workplaces, was summarized in the Benjamin Aaron
Lecture that he delivered ten years ago at UCLA to the Labor &
Employment Law Section of the Los Angeles County Bar
Association. His remarks were published in 1991 in what is now the
Berkeley Journal of Employment & Labor Law.180 The trends
Professor Grodin examined in that article can be viewed as
harbingers of the future of our field.
In brief, Grodin observed that, in the late twentieth century, the
American model of governing the workplace was in the midst of a
dramatic shift toward the European model.181 That is, the United
States was relying less on private ordering through collective
bargaining and more on direct statutory regulation, such as Title VII,
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the like. He believed
that this shift benefited workers primarily because it resulted in a less
authoritarian and a more democratic workplace. He noted that a
number of principles were being imported from the state and federal
constitutions to work this transformation. Usually, this importation
was being accomplished by analogy to constitutional principles rather
than by direct application of particular constitutional provisions;
however, the impact was all the same. Professor Grodin offered five
examples of constitutional principles that now protect many
employees working in both the public and the private sectors.
The first example was the preservation of certain privileges and
immunities. He found this principle implicit in legislative and judicial
pronouncements that workers should not be fired in derogation of
overriding public policies applicable to all citizens, such as the need
for truthful testimony in legal proceedings.18 2
The second example was the protection of freedom of expression
and association. He traced this constitutional principle to judicial
decisions and legislative enactments that broadened First
Amendment-type rights into two areas: first, speech directed toward
the improvement of job conditions; and second, objections by the
agency fee-paying employee, who may not be compelled to support

180. Joseph R. Grodin, Constitutional Values in the Private Sector Workplace, 13
INDUS. REL. L.J. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Grodin, ConstitutionalValues].
181. See generally Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Characterof American
Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394 (1971).
182. Grodin, Constitutional Values, supra note 180, at 17-18; see, e.g., Tameny v. At.
Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
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the political causes of the union that represents her.18 3 Of course, it is
a short leap from protecting the speech of these employees to that of
the whistleblower who discloses to public authorities information
regarding his employer's violation of public policy as codified in a
statute or regulation. 184
The third example was privacy, for which he found direct support
in article 1, section 1 of the California Constitution. 185 At the time
Grodin was writing,186 much of the debate about privacy in the
workplace centered on random drug testing. Today, however, no
discussion of privacy is complete without reference to the tools of the
virtual workplace in the New Economy. The California Supreme
Court has agreed that an employee has a right to privacy in the
workplace and that drug testing implicates her reasonable
expectations in preserving that right, but has limited the scope of such
privacy rights.187 That decision and others surely portend similar
findings with respect to employee E-mail, internet use, and other
work-related activities.
The fourth example was equal protection, for which Professor
Grodin found support in statutes proscribing race, sex, and other
forms of status discrimination. He predicted that the equal protection
principle will be expanded to prohibit not only status discrimination
based on race, sex and similar classifications, but also any type of
disparate treatment of similarly situated employees who are subject
to unequal discipline.188
The fifth and final example was a due-process-type protection.
He traced this type of protection in the limitations on an employer's
right to terminate without just cause, imposed both by collective
bargaining agreements and by implied-in-fact contracts. He argued
that just cause necessarily includes a procedural component in which
every employee should be entitled to notice and an opportunity to
respond before she is terminated or disciplined. 189 Certainly, this is
no surprise in light of his majority opinion in Pugh, and there is some
183. Grodin, ConstitutionalValues, supra note 180, at 18-24. For a summary of current
agency fee law, see Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Wages of Syntax: Why the Cost
of Organizinga Union Firm's Non-Union Competition Should Be Charged to "Financial
Core" Employees, 47 CATH. U.L. REv. 979, 988-92 (1998).
184. See, e.g., Luck v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App. 1990) (upholding
privacy claim by employee fired for refusing to submit to random urine test for drugs).
185. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
186. See Grodin, ConstitutionalValues, supra note 180, at 25-32.
187. See, e.g., Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200 (Cal. 1997).
188. Grodin, ConstitutionalValues, supranote 180, at 32-35.
189. Id.at 35-37.
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evidence that California courts are broadening the application of the
"just cause" doctrine.1 90
Although Professor Grodin will surely wish to say more about
the future of labor and employment law, he already has made
significant inroads with the foregoing observations. This endeavor
calls to mind something he wrote in his memoir about his late friend
and mentor Mat Tobriner. In a famous essay called "The Fox and the
Hedgehog," Isaiah Berlin divided thinkers into two categories: those
who know several truths (the foxes), and those who know one big
truth (the hedgehogs). Tobriner, according to Grodin, was "an
aspiring hedgehog" because he was "forever seeking to one big truth
but far too modest ever to assert, or even think, that he had found
it."191 Tobriner did admit to knowing several important truths,
however, the most important of which was that the purpose of the law
is
to serve the interests and needs of individual human beings. How
to protect the welfare, freedom, privacy, and integrity of the
individual in a society without jeopardizing the institutions
necessary for its collective existence was for him the central
challenge both when he was representing unions and when he
192
became a judge.
His article on constitutional values in the workplace, taken
together with his other written contributions, compels me to say the
same thing about Grodin the advocate, Grodin the jurist, and Grodin
the scholar. As he once said about his mentor, Grodin is a fox who
aspires, at some level, to be hedgehog. Given the breadth and depth
of labor and employment law, this aspiration is a monumental task,
but a worthwhile one to those of us whose job is to make sense of it
all. By my lights, no single person has had a greater impact on how
we do this job in California than Joseph R. Grodin.

190. See, e.g., Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412, 422-23 (Cal. 1998)
(holding that an employer proves good cause for termination consistent with an impliedin-fact contract by showing that it acted reasonably and in good faith after conducting an
investigation in which employee had notice and opportunity to respond to accusations
against him).
191. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 9.
192. Id. at 9-10.
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APPENDIX A
REPORTED CALIFORNIA LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW DECISIONS
OF JUSTICE GRODIN
MAJORITY OPINIONS

CASE

WINeNER

LOSER

1.

Bertuccio v. Superior Court,173 Cal.
Rptr. 411 (Ct. App. 1981).

Employer

Union

2.

Campbell Mun. Employees Ass'n v.
City of Campbell,
182 Cal. Rptr. 461 (Ct. App. 1982).

Union

Employer

3.

Carianv. Agric. Labor Relations Bd.
(Carian1), 685 P.2d 701 (Cal. 1984).

Union/
Government
enforcement
agency

Employer

4.

Carpenters46 N. Cal. Counties
Conference Bd. v. Valentine, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 500 (Ct. App. 1982).

Union

Employer

5.

Cranston v. City of Richmond, 710
P.2d 845 (Cal. 1985).

Employer

Employee

6.

Evans v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals
Board,703 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1985).

Union/
Employees ( )

Government
enforcement
agency ( )

NO ORDINARY JOE
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MAJORITY OPINIONS CONTINUED

HOLDING
Superior court has jurisdiction to issue strike
injunction so long as unfair labor practices
charges have been filed with the Agric. Lab.
Relations Bd.

NOTES
Previously-issued T.R.O. was
dissolved and employer's request
for injunctive relief remanded to
determine extent necessary to
prevent union from obstructing
ingress and egress.

City violated municipal ordinance prescribing
procedures and timing for determining payment
of retroactive salary and insurance premium
increases.
ALRB has authority to regulate union organizing
campaign among employees of agricultural
employer, including power to order grower to
provide union with Excelsior-type employee list.
Arbitration award issued pursuant to multiemployer collective bargaining agreement is
enforced over single employer's objection that
the contract was adhesive and therefore
unenforceable.
City personnel rule providing employees may be
disciplined for "conduct unbecoming" personnel
in city service is not unconstitutionally vague as
applied to a police officer who, having been
previously warned about his driving habits and
notified that his conduct was being closely
observed, drove his car with inoperative lights in
the middle of night and led fellow officers on a
wild chase over wet and slippery streets at speeds
up to 95 MPH, and dismissal was not excessive
Special payments received by employees upon
retirement could not be used to offset
unemployment benefits to the extent that such
payments represented accrued but unused
vacation pay, but could be used to offset
unemployment benefits to extent such payments
represented other compensation.

Although they prevailed, the
employees were denied attorneys'
fees.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

MAJORITY OPINIONS
CASE

WINNER

LOSER

7.

Hayworth v. City of Oakland, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 214 (Ct. App. 1982).

Employees

Employer

8.

Hentzel v. Singer Co.,
188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Ct. App. 1982).

Employee

Employer

9.

LJ. Weinrot & Son, Inc. v. Jackson,
708 P.2d 682 (Cal. 1985).*

Third party
tortfeasor

Employer

10.

Napa Ass'n of Pub. Employees SEIU
614 v. County of Napa, 159 Cal. Rptr.
522 (Ct. App. 1979).

Union

Employer

11.

Nish Noroian Farms v. Agric. Labor
Relations Bd., 677 P.2d 1170 (Cal.
1984).

Union/
Government
Enforcement
agency

Employer

12.

Porterv. Quillin,
177 Cal. Rptr. 45 (Ct. App. 1981).

Union/
Government
Enforcement

Objecting
employees

agency

13.

Pugh v. See's Candies,Inc., 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981).

Employee

Employer

14.

Rivcom Corp. v. Agric. Labor
Relations Bd., 670 P.2d 305
(Cal. 1983).

Union/
Government
enforcement
agency

Employer

15.

Sanchez v. Cal, Unemployment Ins.
Appeals Bd., 685 P.2d 61 (Cal. 1984).

Employee

Employer/
Government
Enforcement
agency

NO ORDINARY JOE
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MAJORITY OPINIONS CONTINUED
HOLDING

NOTES

City's compliance with court-ordered affirmative
action plan pending appeal regarding validity of
plan was not safe harbor from reverse
discrimination suit by white fire fighters.
Claim for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy by employee who was allegedly
fired for protesting hazardous working conditions
survives enactment of Labor Code provision
prohibiting discharge due to employee's activity
relating to health and safety matters.

Early application of Tameny
principles.

Employer whose president was struck and
injured by automobile fails to state cause of
action against third party tortfeasor who
operated automobile.

Holding later superseded in part by
statute. See Lim v. Silverton, 72 Cal
Rptr. 408,408 (Ct. App. 1997).

Among other things, the court held that a
petition to compel arbitration is not waived
merely because the employer alleges that a
grievance was filed late.

Disagreed with by Platt Pacific, Inc.
v. Andelson, 862 P.2d 158,163 (Cal.
1993).

To determine whether grower has violated duty
to bargain under Agric. Labor Relations Act,
ALRB must consider list of various factors.
Union may give consent for deduction of meal
credits from employees' pay so long as practice is
consistent with minimum wage law.
Employee fired after thirty-two years of
employment in which he worked his way up from
dish washer to vice president; employee
demonstrates prima facie case of wrongful
termination in breach of implied-in-fact contract.
ALRB order finding grower to be successor
employer and requiring it not only to recognize
union but also to hire predecessor's employees is
entitled to deference and enforcement.
Whistleblower and union activists who were
harassed at work had good cause to resign and
thus remain eligible to collect unemployment
compensation.

Landmark implied contract case
cited 297 times as of 213101; defense
verdict returned at trial on remand,
Pugh v. See's Candies,Inc., 250 Cal.
Rptr. 195 (Ct. App. 1988).
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MAJORITY OPINIONS
CASE

WINNER

LOSER

16.

San Jose TeachersAss'n v. Superior
Court,700 P.2d 1252 (Cal. 1985).

Union

Objecting
employees

17

Union of Am. Physicians v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 181 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Ct. App.
1982).

Union

Employer/
Government
enforcement
agency

18.

Harry CarianSales v. Agric. Labor
Relations Bd., 703 P.2d 27 (Cal. 1985).

Unionl
Government
enforcement
agency

Employer

19.

Santillano v. State Pers.Bd., 173 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (Ct. App. 1981).

Employee

Employer/
Government
enforcement
agency

20.

Taylor v. Bd. of Trs., 683 P.2d 710
(Cal. 1984).

Employee

Employer/
Government
enforcement
agency

21.

Figueroa v. Hous. Auth., 182
Cal. Rptr. 497 (Ct. App.
1982).

Employee

Employer/
Government
enforcement
agency

22.

Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc., 702 P.2d
212, (Cal. 1985).*

Unlicensed real
estate broker

Corporate real
estate seller

NO ORDINARY JOE
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MAJORITY OPINIONS CONTINUED

HOLDING
Union is entitled to collect full agency fee over
objection of employees claiming portions were
not reasonably related to collective bargaining;
Public Employment Relations Board has
exclusive jurisdiction in first instance to
determine relatedness.

NOTES
Opinion vacated by Abernathy v.
San Jose Teachers Ass'n, 475 U.S.
1063 (1986) and remanded to the
Supreme Court of California for
further consideration in light of
Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,
475 U.S. 292 (1986).

Civil service commission violated ordinance
prescribing proper procedure for surveying and
fixing prevailing wages so as to determine salaries
of physicians employed by City and County of
San Francisco.
ALRB has broad authority to issue Gissel-type
bargaining order to remedy grower's "egregious"
conduct, which had included committing thirty
unfair labor practices during union organizing
campaign, even though union never won election.
Employee who was terminated from civil service
position during purported 6-month probationary
period actually worked or should have worked
105 days - long enough to pass probation -- and
therefore, is permanent employee entitled to full
due process protections.
Substitute teacher who replaced permanent
employee on long-term leave, served 75% of
school days, and performed duties normally
required of certificated employee of District, is
entitled to a hearing to determine whether he was
qualified for any available permanent positions.
Housing authority employee's "permanent"
status under employer's personnel policies as well
as statutory mandate confers "property right" in
his job sufficient to warrant full due process
protections.
Although there is no "finder's fee exception" to
statute of frauds, plaintiff, an unlicenced real
estate broker and corporate board member, was
not precluded from invoking estoppel to plead
statute, where defendant had benefitted from
sale pursuant to oral finder's fee arrangement.

Rare dissent from Grodin
employment opinion by Mosk, J.,
joined by Lucas, J.

286
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MAJORrIY OPINIONS
CASE"
23.

Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d
1192 (Cal. 1982).*

* Employment-related decision

WINNR
Franchisor

LOSER
Franchisees
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MAJORITY OPINIONS CONTINUED
HOLDING

NOTES
1-

Adhesive arbitration provision of franchise
agreement is binding and enforceable against
franchisees, but Federal Arbitration Act does not
preempt California Franchise Investment Law
purporting to regulate enforcement of such
provisions.

Reversed by United States Supreme
Court as to Federal Arbitration Act
preemption issue, Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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APPENDIX A
REPORTED CALIFORNIA LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW DECISIONS
OF JUSTICE GRODIN
CONCURRING OPINIONS

CASE

WINNER

LOSER

1.

Malone v. W. Conference of
Teamsters Pension Trust,
168 Cal. Rptr. 210 (Ct. App.
1980).*

Deceased
employee's
beneficiary

Benefit trust fund

2.

Cal. Sch. Employees Ass'n v. King
City Union Elementary Sch. Dist.,
172 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Ct. App. 1981).

Employer

Union

3.

El Rancho Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Nat'l Educ. Ass'n,
663 P.2d 893, (Cal. 1983).

Union

Employer

4.

Amador v. Unemployment Ins.
Appeals Bd., 677 P.2d 224 (Cal.
1984).

Employee

Employer

NO ORDINARY JOE
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CONCURRING OPINIONS CONTINUED

HOLDING

NOTES

Break-in-service rule, under which deceased
employee was determined to be ineligible for
benefits because he had failed to work at least 15
consecutive years before retirement, is arbitrary,
capricious, unreasonable, and unlawful, where
employee, after working more than 16
consecutive years in covered employment,
changed to different type of employment for 4
years before resuming covered employment.

According to Grodin, J., result and
reasoning are correct, but
concurring opinion by Richardson,
J., is mistaken insofar as it takes the
position that strikes by public
employees are illegal in California - Grodin's position endorsed two
years later in County Sanitation
DistrictNo. 2 v. Los Angeles

Decision by school district's governing board to
lay off teacher aides is not void for lack of
compliance with statute governing board's voting
procedures.

699 P. 2d 835 (Cal. 1985).
According to Grodin, J., dissenting
opinion by Mosk, J., is based on
"fundamentally wrong" premise
employee was insubordinate;
majority is correct under principles
established by Rabago v.

County Employees Ass'n Local 660,

Unemployment InsuranceAppeals

Board, 148 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Ct. App.
1978).
Superior court's jurisdiction to entertain
complaint for damages arising out of teachers'
strike led by noncertified unions is preempted by
the Public Employee's Relations Board's
exclusive initial jurisdiction to determine whether
the strike constituted unfair labor practices.

According to Grodin, J., result and
reasoning are correct, but
concurring opinion by Richardson,
J., is mistaken insofar as it takes the
position that strikes by public
employees are illegal in California - Grodin's position endorsed two
years later in County Sanitation
DistrictNo. 2 v. Los Angeles
County Employees Ass'n Local 660,

Among other things, the Court held that a
worker who was discharged for willfully refusing
to perform work that she reasonably and in good
faith believed would jeopardize health of others
has not committed "misconduct" disqualifying
her from collecting unemployment insurance
benefits.

699 P. 2d 835 (Cal. 1985).
According to Grodin, J., dissenting
opinion by Mosk, J., is based on
"fundamentally wrong" premise
employee was insubordinate;
majority is correct under principles
established by Rabago v.
Unemployment InsuranceAppeals

Board, 148 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Ct. App.
1978).
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CONCURRING OPINIONS
CASE

WINNER

LOSER

5.

State Pers.Bd. v. FairEmployment
& Hous. Comm'n,
703 P.2d 354 (Cal. 1985).

Employeeapplicants/
government
enforcement
agency

Competing
government
enforcement
agency

6.

ProducersDairyDelivery Co. v.
Sentry Ins. Co.
718 P.2d 920 (Cal. 1986).*

Insured employer

Worker's
compensation
carrier

7.

County Sanitation Dist.No. 2 v.
L.A. County Employees Ass'n
Local 660,
699 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1985).

Union

Employer

* Employment-related decision

NO ORDINARY JOE
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CONCURRING OPINIONS CONTINUED
HOLDING

NOTES

Under California Fair Employment & Housing
Act, FEHC and State Personnel Board exercise
concurrent jurisdiction over complaints by job
applicants that Highway Patrol engaged in
employment discrimination; injunction sought by
State Personnel Board against FEHC should not
issue.

According to Grodin, J., neither
majority opinion nor dissenting
opinion by Lucas, J., need reach
question whether complainants are
getting "an undeserved second bite
at the administrative apple."

Among other things, the Court held that insured
employer is collaterally estopped from
relitigating injured party's employee status.

According to Grodin, J., dictum in
majority opinion is unnecessary and
wrong.

Public employees may lawfully engage in
concerted work stoppage for purpose of
improving their wages or conditions of
employment unless doing so poses imminent
threat to public health or safety.

According to Grodin, J., concurring
opinion by Kaus, J. expresses
meritless concern by attempting to
distinguish between availability of
injunction at common law and
availability of damage action.
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APPENDIX B
EMPLOYMENT LAW SCHOLARSHIP OF JUSTICE GRODIN
BOOKS

BOOK
1.

SUMMARY

JOSEPH R. GRODIN, UNION
GOVERNMENT AND THE

Published Ph.D. thesis
produced for program of

LAW: BRITISH AND

study at London School

AMERICAN EXPERIENCES

of Economics.

NOTES

(1961).

Co-edited by
Donald H.
Wollett.

Collective Bargainingin
Public Employment, in 4
LABOR RELATIONS AND

Teaching materials
produced by The Labor
Law Group for unit four

SOCIAL PROBLEMS: A

of series Labor Relations

COURSE BOOK (Joseph R.
Grodin et al. eds., 2d ed.
1975).

and Social Problems:A
Course Book.

3.

PUBLIC-SECTOR
BARGAINING (Benjamin
Aaron et al. eds., 1979).

Research anthology on
collective bargaining law
and policy in public
employment for series
produced by Industrial
Relations Research
Association.

Co-edited by
Benjamin Aaron,
J. Grodin and
James L. Stern.

4.

Collective Bargainingin
Public Employment, in 4
LABOR RELATIONS AND
SOCIAL PROBLEMS: A
COURSE BOOK (Joseph R.
Grodin et al. eds., 3d ed.
1979).

Update of teaching
materials produced by
The Labor Law Group
for unit four of series
Labor Relations and
Social Problems:A
Course Book.

Co-edited by J.
Grodin, Donald
H. Wollett and
Reginald H.
Alleyne.

2.
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BOOKS

BOOK

SUMMARY

NoTEs

5.

PUBLIC-SECTOR
BARGAINING (Benjamin
Aaron et al. eds., 2d ed.,
1988).

Update of research
anthology on collective
bargaining law and
policy in public
employment for series
produced by Industrial
Relations Research
Association.

Co-edited by
Benjamin Aaron,
Joyce M. Najita
and James L.
Stem. Chapter
seven coauthored by J.
Grodin and J.
Najita.

6.

JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE:

Part memoir, part
analysis of seven years'
service on California
Court of Appeal for the
First District and
California Supreme
Court.

Although broadly
about Justice
Grodin's
experiences in
judiciary, the
book deals at
some length with
his thoughts
about Pugh (pp.
27-32,42,73,84-

REFLECTIONS OF A STATE

SUPREME COURT JUSTICE

(1989).

85, 144-45).

z

Collective Bargainingin
Public Employment, in 4
LABOR RELATIONS AND
SOCIAL PROBLEMS: A
COURSE BOOK

(Joseph R. Grodin et al eds.,
4th ed. 1993).

8.

JOSEPH R. GRODIN, THE

CALIFORNIA STATE
CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE (1993).

Update of teaching
materials produced by
The Labor Law Group
for unit four of series
LaborRelations and
SocialProblems:A
Course Book.

Co-edited by J.
Grodin, Donald
H. Wollett and
June M.
Weisberger.

Annotated guide to our
state constitution,
including article XIV,
which governs minimum
wage, 8-hour workday,
mechanics' liens, and
inmate labor.

Co-authored by J.
Grodin, Calvin R.
Massey and
Richard B.
Cunningham.
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EMPLOYMENT LAW SCHOLARSHIP OF JUSTICE GRODIN
MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTARY

COMMENTARY

SUMARY

NOTES

1.

Joseph R. Grodin
& Matthew 0.
Tobriner, TaftHartley Preemption in the Area
of NLRB Inaction,
44 Cal. L. Rev. 663
(1956).

Traditional labor law preemption issues are discussed at
length.

Co-authored by
Matthew 0.
Tobriner.

2.

Duane B. Beeson
& Joseph R.
Grodin, State Rightto-Work Laws and
FederalLabor
Policy, 52 CAL. L.
REV. 95 (1964).

In light of the general rule that
federal labor law preempts state
labor regulation, Taft-Hartley
Act § 14(b) is an "anomaly"
deserving of careful attention in
the context of union security
agreements.

Co-authored by
Duane B.
Beeson.

3.

Joseph R. Grodin
& Matthew 0.
Tobriner, The
Individualand the
PublicService
Enterprisein the
New Industrial
State, 55 CAL. L.
REv. 1247 (1967).

The common law responds in
part to the challenges of
organized society by
reformulating common law
principles to impose duties and
obligations on the basis of status
or relationship. One such
reformulation involves reviving
early concepts of enterprises
"affected with a public interest" - a thesis that is examined in
various areas, including the
relationship of individuals to the
unions charged with representing
them.

Co-authored by
Matthew 0.
Tobriner.
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MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTARY

COMMENTARY

SUMMARY

NOTES

4.

Joseph R. Grodin
& Mark A. Hardin,
Public Employee
Bargainingin
Oregon, 51 OR. L.
REV. 7 (1971).

The history, application, and
legal framework of Oregon's
Public Employee Relations Law
and Public Employee Relations
Board are described and
analyzed.

Co-authored by
Mark A. Hardin.

5.

Joseph R. Grodin,
Public Employee
Bargainingin
California:The
Meyers-MiliasBrown Act in the
Courts, 23
HASTINGS L.J. 719
(1972).

The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act is
either silent or vague on most
major areas of concern and is
basically no more than a general
legislative approval for collective
bargaining. It does not delineate
any legislative intent to guide the
courts. Only by a substantial
revision will the Act be a useful
device for regulating local labor
relations in California.

The secondary
authority on
MMB most cited
by California
appellate courts.

6.

Joseph R. Grodin,
Arbitrationof
Public Sector Labor
Disputes: The
Nevada
Experiment,28
INDus. & LAB.
REL REv. 89
(1974).

The history and application of
interest arbitration to public
sector labor disputes in Nevada is
discussed.

Observes that
interest
arbitration can
protect
employees from
the costs of a
strike and give
leverage to
unions incapable
of striking
effectively.
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MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTARY
COMMENTARY
7.

9.

SUMMARY

NOTES

Joseph R. Grodin,
PoliticalAspects of
Public Sector
Interest Arbitration,
64 CAL. L. REV.
678 (1976).

Binding interest arbitration calls
upon arbitrators to make social
policy decisions otherwise
reserved for elected or appointed
officials. Without sacrificing
arbitral neutrality, a "listing of
possible ingredients" for
maximizing political
responsibility is offered.

Joseph R. Grodin,
Introductionto
Farm Labor Law,
11 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 201 (1978).

The California Agric. Labor
Relations Act is experimental not
only because it is the first attempt
to regulate agricultural labor
relations in a relatively evenhanded way, but also because it
makes innovative attempts to
meet problems peculiar to the
seasonal and migratory nature of
agriculture labor.

Part of
symposium
devoted to legal
problems in
agriculture.

Joseph R. Grodin,
Toward a Wrongful
Termination Statute
for California,42
HASTINGS L.J. 135
(1990).

The common law presumption of
employment at-will "is on its way
out" in California and most other
states because it is out of step
with job protection systems
present in American collective
bargaining and in Europe,
because of the real life
expectations of workers in the
modern workplace, and because
of our social norms. It is time to
abolish the at-will rule by
legislation that tackles seven
principal issues: (1) the scope of
management decisions on
employment that are to be
governed; (2) the standard of
limitation that should be imposed
on management discretion to
make such decisions; (3) which
employers should be excluded
from coverage; (4) which
employees should be excluded

Although the
National
Conference of
Commissioners
on Uniform State
Laws has tried to
address all seven
points mentioned
by the court by
offering a Model
Employment
Termination Act,
no state,
including
California, has
enacted
legislation
addressing all
these things.

from coverage;
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(5) which agency or tribunal
should enforce the legislation; (6)
the appropriate remedies; and (7)
the extent to which legislation
should preempt competing
theories of recovery.

10.

Joseph R. Grodin,
Past,Presen4 and
Futurein Wrongful
TerminationLaw, 6
LAB. LAW. 97
(1990).

Recent developments in wrongful
termination law from state courts
around the country, including the
California Supreme Court's
decision in Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal.
1988), are noted.

"I have observed
at close range the
gradual but
ineluctable
transition of our
legal system away
from the
characteristically
American model
in which the role
of the state is
simply to
establish a
structure within
which collective
bargaining may
occur, toward the
characteristically
European model,
in which the role
of the state is to
provide certain
basic protections
to employees; in
short, from
process to
values." (p. 97)
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11.

Joseph R. Grodin,
Constitutional
Values in The
PrivateSector
Workplace, 13
INDUS. REL. L.J. I
(1991).

I

SUMMARY

NOTES

Under the classical model of the
workplace, the employer's
ownership of the enterprise
carried with it not only general
authority to control the
workplace but also power to
make employment contingent
upon arbitrary conditions.
Evolving from this classical
model, our system is moving
toward one that protects in the
workplace the values that our
federal and state constitutions
protect in the community at
large. These values, which are
found in devices such as the
National Labor Relations Act
and collective bargaining
agreements, already include -and should be expanded through
-- such doctrines as freedom of

expression and association.
privileges and immunities,
privacy, equal protection, and
due process of law.

12.

Joseph R. Grodin,
Report on the 19931994 Supreme
Court Labor and
Employment Law
Term, 10 LAB.
LAW. 693 (1994).

A dozen labor and employmentrelated cases decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court, including Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S.
17 (1993), and Livadas v.
Bradshaw,512 U.S. 107 (1994),
are reviewed.

To encourage the
Supreme Court
to grant certiorari
in cases raising
questions
important to the
labor and
employment bar
in a period of
dwindling
dockets, the
ABA's Labor &
Employment Law
Section should
participate as
amicus curiae.

NO ORDINARY JOE

January 2001]

MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTARY
COMMENTARY

13.

Joseph R. Grodin,
Arbitrationof
Employment
Discrimination
Claims: Doctrine
and Policy in the
Wake of Gilmer, 14
HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 1 (1996).

SUMMARY

NOTES

Voluntary arbitration of
employment disputes must be
voluntary in a real and genuine
sense. There is little concern
about the genuine, voluntary
nature of arbitration in either the
collective bargaining or
commercial arbitration contexts.
But the situation is different
when an arbitration clause
appears as "boiler plate" in a
document produced by unequal
bargaining power, such as
between most individual
employees and management. To
this end, enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements
outside the collective bargaining
and commercial areas should be
denied, or at least, conditioned
upon a finding that the
employee's waiver of a judicial
forum was "knowing and
voluntary."

Precluding
enforcement of
pre-dispute
arbitration
agreements
altogether is
better than
attempting to
police them for
fairness because
(1) the
institutional
biases of private
arbitration, such
as limitations on
discovery and
class claims, favor
employers; (2) a
regime of
policing such
agreements,
while not
impossible, poses
serious
jurisprudential
and practical
problems; and (3)
Gilmer
notwithstanding,
there is
unavoidable
tension between
private dispute
resolution
procedures,
which emphasize
privacy and
finality, and
public norms,
which emphasize
compensating
individual for
legally sanctioned
wrongs.
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14.

Joseph R. Grodin,
On the Interface
Between Labor and
Employment
Law-Labor
Arbitration: Past,
Present, and Future,
19 BERKELEY J.

EMP. & LAB. L.

307 (1998).

SUMMAy

NOTES

"It is useful to think of labor law
and employment law as
alternative and complementary
ways of governing the workplace,
one aiming to institutionalize a
mechanism for governance
through collective bargaining, the
other governing directly through
legal regulation." These regimes
"coexist in both non-union and
union workplace... " but, "like
the interaction of tectonic plates
moving underneath the earth's
surface," their contact "gives rise
to the legal equivalent of
earthquakes and volcanic
eruptions." In recent years, such
seismic events have gathered
around the institution of
arbitration, especially the
questions of whether and to what
extent the existence of an
arbitration procedure, or its
actual utilization, might affect the
rights of individual employees to
assert claims under external law
independently of that procedure.

Correctly
forecasts the
result in Wright v.
Universal
Maritime Corp.,
525 U.S. 70
(1998).

Original article
reprinted as part
of Hastings Law
Journal's fiftieth
anniversary
celebration.

15.

Joseph R. Grodin,
Author's Comments
to Public Employee
Bargainingin
California: The
Meyers-MiliasBrown Act in the
Courts, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 761
(1999).

A quarter century after writing
his first article on the MMBA,
Professor Grodin observes that
"what is most surprising is how
little has changed."

16.

Joseph R. Grodin,
Either-or
Arbitrationfor
Public Employee
Disputes, 11 INDUS.
REL. 260 (1972).

The costs and benefits of interest
arbitration are explored.
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17.

Joseph R. Grodin,
CaliforniaPublic
Employee
Bargaining
Revisited The MMB
Act in the Appellate
Courts,21 CAL.
PUB. EMP. REP.
(CPER) 2 (1974).

The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act's
strengths and weaknesses, as
demonstrated by its application
in reported cases decided since its
enactment, are discussed.

18.

Joseph R. Grodin,
California
AgriculturalLabor
Act: Early
Experience, 15

Member Grodin's experiences on
the inaugural Agric. Labor
Relations Board are discussed.

NOTES

INDUS. REL. 275

(1976).
19.

Joseph R. Grodin,
CaliforniaPublic
Employee
Bargaining:The
MMB Act in
Relation to Local
Chartersand
Ordinances,36 CAL.
PUB. EMP. REP.

Member Grodin's experiences on
the inaugural Agric. Labor
Relations Board are
discnssed.Member Grodin's
experiences on the inaugural
Agric. Labor Relations Board are
discussed.

(CPER) 2 (1978).

20.

Joseph R. Grodin,
When Greatness
Dawned:In Praise
of the State High
Court's Opinion in
Marinship, About
Discriminatory
Union Practices,
Decided 50 years
Ago,14 CAL. LAW.
14 (1994).

Tribute to opinion by Gibson, C.
J., in James v. Marinship Corp.,
155 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1944), which
refused to enforce closed shop
provision on behalf of union
whose membership was closed to
Black workers.

California's
equivalent of
Steele v.
Louisville &
Nashville
RailroadCo., 323
U. S. 192 (1944),
which was issued
only days earlier.
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21.

Joseph R. Grodin,
Travels With Otto,
30 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 931 (1997).

SUMMAY
A memorial to the late California
Supreme Court Justice (Ret.)
Otto Kaus that includes this
recollection: "Otto did love to
talk. In fact, when he was not
talking I knew something was
amiss. One day I was driving
home with one of our research
attorneys in the front and Otto in
the back. We started to talk
about a case that interested me a
good deal because of my labor
law background -- it involved the

remedy for union members who
complained of their dues money
being used for purposes to which
they objected -- and I was holding

forth at what must have been
boring length, for when we got
off the [San Francisco-Oakland
Bay] [B]ridge I turned around to
observe Otto sleeping soundly."
P. 931

NOTES

